At Eurocrypt 2011, Wee presented a generalization of threshold public key encryption, threshold signatures, and revocation schemes arising from threshold extractable hash proof systems. In particular, he gave instances of his generic revocation scheme from the DDH assumption (which led to the Naor-Pinkas revocation scheme), and from the factoring assumption (which led to a new revocation scheme). We expand on Wee's work in two directions: (a) We propose threshold extractable hash proof instantiations from the "Extended Decisional Diffie-Hellman" (EDDH) assumption due to Hemenway and Ostrovsky (PKC 2012). This in particular yields EDDH-based variants of threshold public key encryption, threshold signatures, and revocation schemes. In detail, this yields a DCRbased revocation scheme. (b) We show that our EDDH-based revocation scheme allows for a mild form of traitor tracing (and, thus, yields a new trace-and-revoke scheme). In particular, compared to Wee's factoring-based scheme, our DCR-based scheme has the advantage that it allows to trace traitors.
Introduction
Broadcast encryption, revocation schemes, traitor tracing, and traceand-revoke schemes. In a broadcast encryption (BE) scheme [17] , a sender is able to generate ciphertexts that only members of a privileged set S ⊆ {1, . . . , N } of users -each given a long-lived user secret key -can decrypt. There exists a large number of BE schemes under various assumptions and with various efficiency characteristics (e.g., [17, 20, 8, 3, 21, 34, 42, 41] ). In this work, we focus on revocation schemes, which are a variant of BE schemes, where a set of revoked users (e.g., non-paying subscribers) R = {1, . . . , N } \ S is given as input to the encryption function. Revocation schemes proposed in the literature are, e.g., [38, 50, 36, 23, 13, 14, 54, 22, 12, 33, 53] . A particularly interesting property a cryptosystem in the broadcast encryption setting can have is traceability [11] , i.e., the ability to trace a "pirate" decryption box back to the corrupted user(s), called traitor(s), who constructed it. Thus, traceability allows to identify a traitor (or a coalition of traitors). Such schemes are called traitor tracing schemes and a variety of them was proposed, e.g., [11, 39, 40, 32, 47, 48, 37, 5, 18, 43, 51, 28, 45, 30, 29, 35, 10, 49, 9, 16, 46, 1, 4, 6] . The combination of revocation and traceability is an aspiring goal. We stress that combining these properties is nontrivial (see [7, Section 4.1] ). Nevertheless, there are schemes, e.g., [19, 38, 36, 50, 23, 13, 14, 31, 15, 7, 26] 1 , which provide a solution for this problem. These schemes are called trace-and-revoke schemes.
Threshold extractable hash proof systems. In [53] , Wee established threshold extractable hash proof systems (TEHPS) as a generalization of extractable hash proof systems (EHPS) [52] . Applying the concept of TEHPSs, Wee explains threshold public key encryption, threshold signatures, and revocation schemes from the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH), from the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH), and from the factoring assumptions which -at least in the case of factoring -led to new cryptosystems. We expand the generic view of [53] by providing a TEHPS from the "Extended Decisional Diffie-Hellman" (EDDH) assumption due to Hemenway and Ostrovsky [24] . The EDDH assumption generalizes the DDH and Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumptions. By our first result, we obtain threshold public key encryption, threshold signatures, and revocation schemes from the EDDH assumption. In particular, our generic system extends the generic view of revocation schemes from [53] (recapped below) and, additionally, via our second result, it yields a new trace-and-revoke scheme from the DCR assumption. (This is not known for the factoring-based instance of [53] .)
A generic revocation scheme. Recently, Wee [53] gave a very simple and elegant generic view of revocation schemes. He explains and generalizes previous constructions (e.g., [38, 50] ). The public key in these constructions contains the coefficients of a secret polynomial f (x) = a 0 + a 1 x + · · · + a t x t "in the exponent" as g a0 , g a1 , . . . , g at . Note that this allows to compute values g f (x) for arbitrary x. A ciphertext is of the form C = (R, u, (u f (id) ) id∈R ), where R is a set of t revoked identities. (The u f (id) can be computed from pk , and using knowledge of an exponent r with u = g r .) The corresponding encapsulated key 2 is s = u f (0) . Any user with identity id in the system possesses a user secret key usk id = f (id ). (Of course, 0 is not an allowed identity for a user.) If id ∈ R, then a user can derive a (t + 1)-st share u usk id = u f (id) and compute u f (0) through Lagrange interpolation of the t + 1 values u f (id) (for id ∈ R ∪ {id }). Depending on the domain over which we are working, and on how a "raw key" s = u f (0) is post-processed, this yields a revocation scheme from the DDH, the CDH, or the factoring assumption. Note that although similar secret sharing techniques are common in broadcast encryption, Wee's scheme is particularly simple and appealing from a conceptual point of view.
Our first result: an EDDH-based TEHPS instance. By giving a slightly different generic view, we extend the work of Wee to obtain threshold extractable hash proof instantiations from the extended decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Concretely, the EDDH assumption works in a group G with subgroups G, H. It states that, given g, g x , and g y , elements g xy are computationally indistinguishable from elements g xy · h, where g ∈ G and h ∈ H are uniformly chosen, and x, y are uniform exponents. For G = H, we have the DDH assumption, and if G = Z * N , G = {x N | x ∈ G}, and H = 1 + N , we have the DCR assumption.
In particular, our first result yields EDDH-based threshold encryption, signatures, and revocation schemes. We stress that the EDDH-based instances use a potential stronger assumption (i.e., DCR) as opposed to Wee's factoring-based schemes. Nevertheless, to give a foreshadow, this slightly stronger assumption enables us -via our second result -to obtain a new DCR-based trace-andrevoke scheme which, again, is not known to achieve from Wee's factoring-based scheme. Our revocation scheme is similar to the above generic scheme, but has
The shared key is extracted from h. Hence, instead of directly using u f (0) 1 as shared key, we use it to blind the actual key h. This is consistent with the EDDH assumption: EDDH does not state that g xy looks random -it does state however that g xy can be used to blind an H-element. The security analysis of this modified scheme is similar to the analysis of previous schemes. The only difficulties arise out of the fact that the group order of G may not be known (e.g., in the case of DCR). Hence, we must avoid inversion operations in the exponent. (Such inversion operations arise during Lagrange interpolation of the polynomial f in the exponent.) More details about the technique we use to avoid inversions in the exponent are given below.
Our second result: traceability of the EDDH-based revocation scheme. We prove that our EDDH-based revocation scheme also supports a mild form of black-box traitor tracing. That is, we prove that any pirate box produced by a coalition of T ≤ (t + 1)/2 corrupted users can be traced back to a user in that coalition. Tracing requires only completely black-box access to the pirate box and works for imperfect decryption boxes (where the box is allowed to decrypt well-formed ciphertexts invalidly down to some threshold). Further, we allow adversarially chosen revoked sets R. Similar black-box tracing strategies in the revocation setting were considered in previous works, e.g., in [50, 15] . But unlike in, e.g., [50] , our tracing algorithm works with imperfect pirate boxes that may even only work for an adversarially chosen set R of revoked users. The tracing model in [15] also considers imperfect decryption boxes and adversarially chosen revoked users, but for a different scheme. (To achieve black-box traceability in the BE setting we note that similar techniques are common, e.g., in [7] .) However, we stress that our focus is on the generic view of constructing trace-and-revoke schemes. Nevertheless, our tracing strategy is explained in more detail below.
More on the used techniques. To construct revocation schemes from the EDDH assumption -in which the order of the subgroup G might not be known as opposed to Wee's generic construction above -we use a technique called "clearing the denominator" in the exponent. This tool was used before, but in different scenarios to ours, e.g., in [44, 53, 2] . Hence, we can avoid Lagrangian coefficient inversion in the exponent and are able to construct our EDDH-based revocation scheme. For traceability, consider random ciphertexts of the form [27] by Kiayias and Yung for a more general case and a formal analysis.) Thus, we adapt our strategy by considering "semi-random ciphertexts" of the form
Such ciphertexts are indistinguishable from real ones, even when knowing the user keys for I. However, when using user keys for identities outside of I, then we will get a different, random result. Our tracing strategy will hence make a guess for the set I of corrupted users, and confirm the guess by checking if B decrypts ciphertexts C R,I rnd correctly. (Note that this is very similar to the "black-box confirmation" argument defined by Boneh and Franklin [5] .) The main challenge in our proof consists of handling the case when B knows some, but not all user keys for I. In that case, we have to make sure that we output an identity in I that surely corresponds to a traitor. Similar traceability strategies were already considered, e.g., in [5] (but with a restriction on how the pirate box is built), and in [28, 9, 7] (for very different schemes). In the revocation setting the tracing technique of Tzeng and Tzeng [50] also considers semi-random ciphertexts as those from (1). However, the tracing algorithm of [50] assumes a pirate box with perfect decryption, and, more importantly, has to choose the analog of the revoked set R from (1) by itself. Dodis, Fazio, Kiayias, and Yung [15] consider imperfect pirate boxes and adversarially chosen revoked users in the revocation setting, but for a different scheme. Again, we stress that the novelty of our work lies in the fact that we extend Wee's generic view of revocation schemes by providing an EDDH-based trace-and-revoke variant which, in particular, generalizes (known) DDH-based and (new) DCR-based trace-and-revoke schemes.
Preliminaries
Notation. For n ∈ N, let [n] := {1, . . . , n}. Throughout the paper, k ∈ N denotes the security parameter. For a finite set S, we denote by s ← S the process of sampling s uniformly from S. For a probabilistic algorithm A, we write y ← A(x) for the process of running A on input x with uniformly chosen random coins, and assigning y the result. If A's running time is polynomial in k, then A is called probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT). A function f : N → R is negligible if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial (i.e., if
(Binary) relations for hard search problems [52, 53] . Following the definition of (binary) relations for hard search problems in [53] , let R pp be a family of binary relations, where pp is a public parameter. We assume the existence of two PPT algorithms: given the security parameter k in unary, SampP(1 k ) outputs a public parameter pp together with a secret parameter sp, while SampR(1 k , pp) outputs a binary relation (u, s) ∈ R pp such that given only u it is hard to find s. (To make random coins r explicit, we may write SampR(1 k , pp; r).) Concretely, we define the one-way property of binary relations for hard search problems in the sense that with overwhelming probability over pp, for all u, there exists at most one s such that (u, s) ∈ R pp , and, given an adversary A that gets pp and u with (u, s) ← SampR(1 k , pp), there exists an efficiently computable generator G pp such that, for all A, Adv prg
Lagrange interpolation and Vandermonde matrices. Fix a field F and
It is easy to see that det(V x0,...,
Conversely, given values y 0 , . . . , y d ∈ F, we can via (a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a d ) = V −1 x0,...,x d · (y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y d ) compute coefficients a 0 , . . . , a n ∈ F of a polynomial f (x) = a 0 +a 1 x+· · ·+a d x d such that f (x i ) = y i . It will be useful to perform such matrixvector multiplications "in the exponent," where generally a matrix M = (M i,j ) ∈ F n×n is known, and a vector x = (x i ) ∈ F n is given in the form X = (X i ) = (g xi ) for some g. We will write M • X :
. If we write y = (y i ) for the "exponent vector" with Y i = g yi , this achieves M · x = y.
The Extended Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. In [24] , Hemenway and Ostrovsky introduced the Extended Decisional Diffie-Hellman (EDDH) assumption. We say that the EDDH assumption holds for group G and sub-
for uniform group elements g and h from G and H, respectively, for uniform exponents a, b, and group order function ord. Additionally, we require that there exists a randomness extractor G eddh
pseudorandom. We note that the EDDH assumption can be instantiated under the DDH and the DCR assumption. (We refer to [24] for further details.)
First result: an EDDH-based TEHPS instance
Threshold extractable hash proof systems. We first restate the definition of threshold extractable hash proof systems (TEHPS) from [53] , in which Wee explains several cryptosystems, i.e., threshold encryption, threshold signatures, and revocation schemes as arising from TEHPSs for a hard search problem with instances u and solution s (defined as above). For public key hk , we define a family of hash functions H hk , which take as input a tag tag and an instance u, and output a hash value H hk (tag, u). A TEHPS TEHPS = (Gen, Share, Pub, Priv, Ext) with tag space T consists of the following PPT algorithms:
Setup. Given the security parameter k ∈ N, the threshold parameter t ∈ N, and system parameters (pp, sp) (defined as above), Gen((pp, sp), 1 k , 1 t ) generates a public key hk and a master secret key msk . Key generation. Share(msk , tag), given the master secret key msk and a tag tag ∈ T , generates a user secret key usk tag for tag tag. Public evaluation. Pub(hk , tag, r), given a public key hk , a tag tag ∈ T , and random r, outputs a hash value H hk (tag, u), with (u, s) = SampR(1 k , pp; r). Private evaluation. Priv(usk tag , u), given a user secret key usk tag and an instance u, outputs a hash value H hk (tag, u). 
there exists a PPT algorithm
SetupSim such that distributions of ω = (hk , usk tag1 , . . . , usk tagt ) in the fol-lowing are statistically close: i.e., we require that
where s ≈ denotes statistically indistinguishable. A TEHPS for the EDDH relation. We now construct a new EDDH-based threshold extractable hash proof system. As opposed to the DDH-based construction in [53] , here, the group order of a subgroup G ⊆ G may not be known (i.e., in the case of DCR). Hence, we must avoid inversion operations in the exponent. We use a technique called "clearing the denominator" that, in a similar way, was used before but in different scenarios; e.g., in [44, 53, 2] . Further, fix a commutative group G and a subgroup H ⊆ G of (known) order n. We assume that a (proper) lower bound d on the smallest prime divisor of n is known. Let G ⊆ G be a cyclic subgroup of (potentially unknown) order q and let K := [B] such that for x ← K, the value x mod q is statistically close to uniform. In that case we will sample an exponent x uniformly from [B], where B = B · 2 k for an upper bound B on q. (Such an upper bound B will always be known.) Further, we need to specify a (binary) relation for the EDDH problem. Therefor, consider
We set the public parameter pp to be (n, g, g sp ) and assume that we can sample g from as above, be as follows: Setup. Gen((pp, sp), 1 k , 1 t ), with pp =: (n, g, g sp ), chooses a polynomial f (x) := sp + a 1 x + · · · + a t x t over K, with uniform exponents a i , for i ∈ [t]. The output is the public key hk := (n, g, g sp , ( g ai ) t i=1 ), with g := g v , for uniform v ← K, and master secret key msk := (sp, (a i ) t i=1 ). We fix a hash function H hk (tag, u) := u f (tag) 1 , with u = (u 1 , u 2 ) and some tag tag ∈ T . For randomness r ∈ K, we have (u, s) = ((g r ,g sp·r · s), s) = SampR(1 k , (n,g,g sp ); r). (Note that we re-randomize the g-elements of pp here.) Sharing. Share(msk , tag), for tag ∈ T , returns usk tag := f (tag). Public Evaluation. Given a public key hk , a tag tag ∈ T , randomness r ∈ K, Pub(hk , tag, r) computes
with (u, s) = SampR(1 k , (n,g,g sp ); r) as above. Private Evaluation. Given usk tag and u = (u 1 , u 2 ), Priv(usk tag , u) outputs u
(Note that the Lagrangian coefficients can be computed iff all tags (tag t+1 ) i∈[t+1] are distinct. If the tags are not distinct we output ⊥.) Now, for ∆ := lcm{ i,j∈[t+1],i =j (tag i − tag j ) ∈ Z} the values ∆ · L i (0), for all i ∈ [t + 1], are integers. Thus, we are able to extract and output the value
(Note that n is always known.)
We now show correctness, (t+1)-extraction, and t-simulation of Construction 3.1. Proof sketch. For all k, t ∈ N, with overwhelming probability over (pp, sp) ← SampP(1 k ), for all r, for all (u, s) ← SampR(1 k , (n,g,g sp ); r), with u = (u 1 , u 2 ), for all (hk , msk ) ← Gen((pp, sp), 1 k , 1 t ), for all tags tag ∈ T , all usk tag ← Share(msk , tag), we have: Correctness. Correctness is easy to verify, i.e., Pub(hk , tag, r) = H hk (tag, u) = Priv(usk tagi , u). ) i∈[t+1] ), for ∆ and fractional Lagrangian coefficients L i (0) as above,
Recall that all ∆ · L i (0), for i ∈ [t + 1], are integers and that we used Lagrangian interpolation in the exponent in ( * ). Thus, we obtain s such that (u, s) ∈ R eddh pp . t-simulation. For all distinct tags (tag i ) i∈[t+1] ∈ (T ) t+1 , there exists a PPT algorithm SetupSim as follows: Choose uniformly y 1 , . . . , y t ← K and set f (tag i ) := y i , for i ∈ [t]. Further, set g := g v , for uniform v ← K, and set g f (0) := (g sp ) v = g sp . Note, that this will uniquely define a polynomial f of degree ≤ t. Let ∆ be as above but with tag t+1 = 0. That (implicitly) determines a vector (∆a 0 , ∆a 1 , . . . , ∆a t ) := (∆ · V −1 tagt+1,tag1,...,tagt ) · (sp, y 1 , . . . , y t ) .
(That is every ∆a i can be written as linear combination of the y i , with appropriate integer coefficients. Here, again, we use ∆ to "clear the denominator" of V −1 's entries.) Subsequently, output (n, g, g a0 , g a1 , . . . , g at ), for g := g ∆ , and (usk tag1 , . . . , usk tagt ) := (y 1 , . . . , y t ). Thus, the distribution of the output of SetupSim and and the distribution of (hk , (Share(msk , tag i )) i∈[t] ) are statistically indistinguishable. Now, by [53, Theorems 1, 2, 3], we derive semantically secure threshold public key encryption, existentially unforgeable threshold signatures in the random oracle model, and semantically secure revocation schemes from the hardness of the EDDH assumption which -at least in the revocation case -yields a new DCR-based revocation scheme. We will now provide details about revocation schemes and recap from [53] how to build them from TEHPSs. Revocation schemes. Opposed to a broadcast encryption scheme, where a set of privileged users S ⊆ {1, . . . , N } (for number of users N ∈ N) is given as input to the encryption function, a revocation scheme receives a set of revoked users R := {1, . . . , N } \ S as input instead. The system then guarantees that users in {1, . . . , N } \ R are able to decrypt correctly while users in R cannot decrypt. We will not directly give a construction of a revocation scheme; rather we will define a revocable key encapsulation mechanism which canonically implies an revocation scheme, but allows for a simpler exposition.
Revocable key encapsulation mechanism. For simplicity, and following [53] , we define the notion of a revocable key encapsulation mechanism (RKEM). An RKEM with identity space ID consists of the following PPT algorithms:
Setup. Gen(1 k , 1 t ), given the security parameter k ∈ N and a revocation threshold t ∈ N, generates a public key pk and a master secret key msk .
Key generation. Share(msk , id ), given the master secret key msk and an identity id ∈ ID, generates a user secret key usk id for identity id . Encapsulation. Enc(pk , R), given the public key pk and a subset R ⊆ ID that contains the identities of up to t revoked users, outputs a ciphertext C and a corresponding key K. Decapsulation. Dec(id , usk id , C), given an identity id , a corresponding user secret key usk id , and a ciphertext C, outputs a key K.
For correctness, we require that for all k, t ∈ N, all (pk , msk ) ← Gen(1 k , 1 t ), all set R ⊆ ID of up to t identities, all (C, K) ← Enc(pk , R), all identities id ∈ ID \ R, and all usk id ← Share(msk , id ), we have Dec(id , usk id , C) = K. We will not define security for RKEMs. We note that these notions can be defined in a straightforward way, and the RKEMs based on TEHPSs from [53] can be proven secure in this sense. (In fact, [53] only shows selective-identity security; we expect, however, that adaptive-identity security can be achieved along the lines of Dodis and Fazio [14] .) As mentioned before, an RKEM implies a revocation scheme. That is, to build a revocation scheme from an RKEM, use the encapsulated key to symmetrically encrypt the message to be broadcasted; analogously, use the decapsulated key for symmetrically decryption. RKEMs from TEHPSs. Following [53] , we recap the construction of an revocable key encapsulation mechanism RKEM = (Gen, Share, Enc, Dec) with iden-tity space ID := T from a threshold extractable hash proof system TEHPS = (Gen , Share , Pub, Ext, Priv) with tag space T as follows:
Setup. Gen(1 k , 1 t ), given security parameter k ∈ N and revocation threshold t ∈ N, samples (pp, sp) ← SampP(1 k ) and outputs public-key-master-secretkey pair (pk , msk ) := Gen ((pp, sp), 1 k , 1 t ). Key extraction. Share(msk , id ), for id ∈ ID, returns usk id ← Share (msk , id ). Encapsulation. Enc(pk , R), for public key pk and R ⊆ ID of size exactly t, chooses a random value r, samples (u, s) ← SampR(1 k , pk ; r), and computes τ id := Pub(hk , id , r), for id ∈ R. The ciphertext is given by C := (R, u, (τ id ) id∈R ), the key is K := G pk (s). Decapsulation. Dec(id , usk id , C), with usk id and C as above, retrieves s := Ext(u, R ∪ {id }, (τ id ) id∈R , Priv(usk id , u)) and outputs K := G pk (s). Correctness is easy to verify. For semantic security, we point to [53, Theorem 3] . Hence, as a result, we derive an EDDH-based revocation scheme.
Second result: ((t + 1)/2, ε)-traceability of the EDDH-based RKEM instance
Trace-and-revoke schemes. A trace-and-revoke scheme connects the properties of a revocation scheme and the benefits of a traitor tracing scheme. As mentioned before, combining these is nontrivial (see [7, Section 4.1] ). Following [5, 15, 9, 7] , we define traceability of an RKEM. (Note, this implicitly defines traceability of a revocation scheme due to the results of Section 3 and, thus, we derive a trace-and-revoke scheme.) Intuitively, we require an efficient algorithm Trace that can, from oracle access to a stateless pirated box B, deduce the identity of at least one party that has been involved in the construction of B. More concretely, suppose an adversary A corrupts a number of devices (i.e., obtains a number of user keys usk id ), and constructs a pirate box B. Suppose that B successfully decrypts ciphertexts for an adversarially specified set R of revoked users. Then we want that Trace, given oracle access to B, can deduce at least one of the identities id whose device A has corrupted. We will also define a relaxation of traceability, dubbed sid-traceability, in which the adversary has to commit to corrupted identities in advance, before even seeing the public key.
Definition 1 (Traceable/sid-traceable RKEM). We say that that an adversary A is T -valid if, in experiment Exp trace RKEM,Trace,A (defined in Figure 1 ), it always chooses t ≥ T , it always outputs a set R of size at most t, and it always makes at most T Share queries. (Note that this definition does not actually depend on Trace, and that t is specified by A itself.) Furthermore, for given pk , R, we define the quality of a Pr Exp sid-trace RKEM,Trace,A,ε (k) = 1 and Exp sid-trace RKEM,Trace,A,ε , defined in Figure 1 , in which A has to output an identity set C of corrupted users of size at most t in advance.
From sid-traceability to traceability. There is a trivial (yet expensive) way to convert sid-traceable RKEMs into traceable ones. Namely, we can simply guess the identities for which an adversary (adaptively) requests user keys. Concretely:
then RKEM is also (T, ε)traceable (with the same Trace algorithm). Concretely, for every adversary A on RKEM's traceability, there is an adversary A of roughly the same complexity on RKEM's sid-traceability, such that Adv sid-trace RKEM,A (k) ≥ Adv trace RKEM,A (k)/ N T . Proof sketch. See full version [25] for a proof sketch.
Relation to our second result. Our second result (below) shows the ((t + 1)/2, ε)-sid-traceability of an EDDH-based RKEM based on threshold extractable hash proofs. Our corresponding tracing algorithm will have a runtime that is linear in N T . Thus, in that case, N T must be polynomial anyway, and the loss in Lemma 1 seems acceptable. More about our tracing strategy. We propose a tracing strategy that is similar to the tracing techniques in the revocation setting given by [50, 15] . However, we stress that the tracing algorithm of [50] assumes a pirate box with perfect decryption, i.e., ε = 1, and chooses the revoked set R by itself. The tracing mode in [15] also considers imperfect decryption boxes, adversarially chosen revoked user sets, and, additionally, allows of querying user secret keys adaptively. (This is possible since their scheme allows to change the public key continuously even after the system setup.) Additionally, both, i.e., [50, 15] , only address the DDH setting. Nevertheless, we stress that the novelty of our work lies in the fact that we propose a new generic view of trace-and-revoke schemes.
Warmup: (1, 2/3)-sid-traceability of the EDDH-based RKEM
We can now state our second result; i.e., we show the traceability of RKEM EDDH which is an EDDH-based RKEM as defined and constructed in Section 3. (This immediately translates to an EDDH-based trace-and-revoke scheme.) As a warmup, we first showcase the (1, 2/3)-sid-traceability of RKEM EDDH .
Informal proof strategy. To explain the overall idea of our tracing algorithm, observe that the decryption of a ciphertext generated by Enc does not depend on which user key was used to decrypt. (This is necessary for correctness.) Hence, we cannot expect that a pirate box B can be traced by feeding it valid ciphertexts generated by Enc. Instead, we will feed B random ciphertexts of the form
We will show that for such random ciphertexts, the result of the (honest) decryption depends on the identity of the used user key usk id . Furthermore, a suitable reduction to the EDDH assumption will show that honestly generated ciphertexts are indistinguishable from random ones. Hence, Trace can go through the set of all possible identities id , and check how often B(C R rnd ) coincides with Dec(id , usk id , C R rnd ). In case B outputs the same as Dec with probability close to 2/3, chances are that we have found the pirate identity. Proof. See the full version [25] for a proof.
General case: ((t + 1)/2, ε)-sid-traceability of RKEM EDDH
Why our tracing strategy for T = 1 does not work. First, observe that our concrete tracing strategy from the proof of Theorem 1 fails if A requests multiple user keys. For instance, A could use multiple user keys to distinguish valid from random ciphertexts. Concretely, A could request two keys usk id1 and usk id2 and let B first check if a given ciphertext decrypts to the same value under both usk id1 and usk id2 . If the decryptions do not match, then B immediately fails.
(Recall that our proof uses the fact that random ciphertexts decrypt differently under different keys.) Such a box B would be useless to our tracing algorithm Trace, since Trace feeds B only random ciphertexts. (See [27] for more details.)
How to adapt our strategy. A natural way to adapt our strategy -this essentially follows the "black-box confirmation" argument from [5] -would seem as follows. Given a set I ⊆ ID of identities, we can construct "semi-random ciphertexts" of the form C R,I rnd = (R, u 1 , (u
uniform of degree ≤ t, but subject to f (id ) = 0 for id ∈ I. We will also define the random quality RQ I B,R of a box B relative to a given revoked set R, and an identity set I ⊆ ID: RQ I B,R := Pr B(C R,I rnd ) = Dec(id , usk id , C R rnd ) , for some id ∈ I. Intuitively, ciphertexts C R,I rnd look consistent from the point of a pirate box that only knows user keys for identities in I. Hence, our tracing strategy for a larger number T of traitors will be as follows. We iterate over all N T identity subsets I ⊆ ID of size T , and approximate RQ I B,R . If the approximation indicates that RQ I B,R ≥ ε, then we have a candidate for the set C of traitors. Unfortunately, there may be many candidates, and not all of them contain only traitors. To filter out one identity that surely is a traitor, we remove identities from I, one at a time. If the quality RQ I B,R drops, we must have removed a traitor. (If the removed identity was no traitor, then B would not have noticed.) Again, this tracing strategy is similar to that of [5, 28, 50, 15, 9, 7] . More formally: Proof. See full version [25] for a proof.
Potential generalizations of our tracing result. There are several dimensions in which one might want to improve our tracing result. We will comment on how our result can be generalized (and when a generalization seems problematic) in the full version [25] .
